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Abstract
The equalization of profit rates as the outcome of free competition is one of
the oldest tenets in theoretical economics. Being intuitively convincing its
premises and implications, though, are not well defined. As Walras put it:
‘To state a theory is one thing; to prove it is another.’ First of all a consistent
concept of profit is required. In the present paper the structural axiom set is
taken as premise. Thereof the determinants of profit and the profit ratio follow.
This makes it possible to definitively state the conditions for uniform profit
ratios in a hierarchical market structure.
JEL D46
Keywords New framework of concepts, Structure-centric, Axiom set, Finan-
cial profit, Competitive structure, Numéraire
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Adam Smith’s notion of the natural price is related to the existence of a single rate
of profit on the capital invested in all sectors and entails the assertion that it is free
competition that quite naturally produces this result, at least approximately and in
the longer run (Vaggi, 2008, p. 2). Since Smith profit rate equalization is an integral
part of theoretical economics. However, as Walras criticized, it was by no means
clear what was meant by this intuitively convincing concept: ‘the term profit, as
they [the English economists] use it, signifies simultaneously interest on capital and
profit of enterprise’ (2010, p. 423, original emphasis).
To put an end to what Davidson much later lamented as endemic ‘Babylonian
incoherent babble’ (Dow, 2005, p. 385), Walras endeavored to set the principle of
free competition on firm foundations:
To state a theory is one thing; to prove it is another. I know that
in economics so-called proofs which are actually nothing more than
gratuitous assertions are doled out and find acceptance again and again.
And precisely for this reason, I submit that economics will not attain
the status of a science until economists are compelled to demonstrate
that which they have hitherto been content, in the main, merely to assert.
(Walras, 2010, p. 427)
To prove an assertion means to demonstrate how it follows consistently from a
small set of foundational ‘hypotheses or axioms or postulates or assumptions or
even principles’ (Schumpeter, 1994, p. 15). General equilibrium theory rests on
a set of behavioral axioms (Arrow and Hahn, 1991, p. v). Human behavior and
proof, though, make a strange couple. The main thesis of the present paper is that
human behavior does not yield to the axiomatic method, yet the axiomatization of
the money economy’s fundamental structure is feasible. The crucial point is not
axiomatization per se but the real world content of axioms. Our objective is to make
the implications of the structural axiom set with regard to uniform profit ratios
explicit.
By choosing objective structural relationships as axioms behavioral hypotheses
are not ruled out. On the contrary, the structural axiom set is open to any behavioral
assumption and not restricted to the standard optimization calculus.
The case for structural axiomatization has been made at length elsewhere (2011a,
2011b, 2011c), thus we can proceed without further programmatic preliminaries. In
the following the minimalistic formal frame that constitutes the pure consumption
economy is set up in section 1. Then, in section 2, profit and the profit ratio as
pivotal concepts for the analysis of the market system are derived from the axiom
set. The distinction between profit and distributed profit is crucial for the analysis
of the functioning of the money economy. Standard profit theory is known to be
incoherent (Desai, 2008), hence a new conceptual approach is in order. In sections 3
to 5 the conditions for uniform profit ratios are formally established for two limiting
cases, that is, for two firms in two different markets and for two firms in a single
market.
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1 Axioms
The first three structural axioms relate to income, production, and expenditures in
a period of arbitrary length. For the remainder of this inquiry the period length is
conveniently assumed to be the calendar year. Simplicity demands that we have at
first one world economy, one firm, and one product. ‘The economic system is made
up of households and firms’ (Arrow and Hahn, 1991, p. 3).
Total income of the household sector Y is the sum of wage income, i.e. the
product of wage rate W and working hours L, and distributed profit, i.e. the product
of dividend D and the number of shares N.
Y =WL+DN |t (1)
Output of the business sector O is the product of productivity R and working
hours.
O = RL |t (2)
Consumption expenditures C of the household sector is the product of price P
and quantity bought X.
C = PX |t (3)
The axioms represent the pure consumption economy, that is, no investment
expenditures, no foreign trade, and no taxes or any other government activity.
2 The overall profit ratio
The business sector’s financial profit Qfi in period t is defined with (4) as the
difference between the sales revenues – for the economy as a whole identical with
consumption expenditures C – and costs – here identical with wage income YW1:
Q f i ≡C−YW ≡ PX−WL ⇐ YW ≡WL |t (4)
For the business sector as a whole to make a profit consumption expenditures C
have in the simplest case to be greater than wage income YW. So that profit comes
into existence in the pure consumption economy the household sector must run a
deficit at least in one period2. This in turn makes the inclusion of the financial sector
1 Profits from changes in the value of financial and non-financial assets are excluded here to streamline
the analysis. For the general case see (2011d, p. 4).
2 It needs hardly emphasis that in the investment economy the process of profit generation appears
more complex. This does not affect the essence of profit but simply removes the formal necessity that
the households have to incur a deficit to get the economy going. This is then done by the investing
business sector. It is not advisable, though, to tackle the complexities of the investment economy
before the pure consumption economy is fully understood. For dissuasive examples of confusion
generated by premature analytical complexity see (Schmitt and Greppi, 1996, pp. 352-356).
3
mandatory. An economic theory that does not include at least one bank that supports
the concomitant credit expansion cannot capture the essential features of the market
economy (2011d, p. 2).
From (4) and (1) follows for the relation of profit and distributed profit:
Q f i ≡C−Y +YD ⇐ YD ≡ DN |t (5)
Definitions are supplemented by connecting variables on the right-hand side of
the identity sign that have already been introduced by the axioms. To the definitions
in (4) and (5) three structural ratios are added now. With (6) the expenditure ratio
rE, the sales ratio rX, and the distributed profit ratio rD is defined:
ρE ≡ CY ρX ≡
X
O
ρD ≡ YDYW |t (6)
From (5), the first axiom (1), and the definitions (6) results for total profits that
it depends on the key ratios rE and rD and the absolute amount of income:
Q f i ≡
(
ρE − 11+ρD
)
Y |t (7)
To get rid of all absolute magnitudes the profit ratio rQ is defined with (8) and
this gives a succinct summary of the structural interrelations of the profit ratio, the
expenditure ratio, and the distributed profit ratio for the business sector as a whole:
ρQ ≡ ρE (1+ρD)−1 ⇐ ρQ ≡ Q f iWL |t (8)
The overall profit ratio rQ is positive if the expenditure ratio rE is >1 or the
distributed profit ratio rD is >0, or both3. In the pure consumption economy no
profit rate exists because no capital exists. Therefore, the profit ratio is the general
concept.
3 Two firms in two markets
The axioms and definitions have first to be differentiated for two firms (2011c,
Appendix). For the relative prices of two products follows from (3) in combination
with (2):
P1
P2
=
R2
R1
L2
L1
C1
C2
if ρX1 = 1; ρX2 = 1 |t (9)
If the markets for both products are cleared the price ratio is inversely pro-
portional to the ratio of productivities and the ratio of labor inputs and directly
proportional to the ratio of the consumption expenditures for the two products. This
implicates a soft budget constraint, that is, the sum of consumption expenditures
C1+C2 needs in the general case not be equal to income Y.
3 For the full implications of the profit definition see (2011a, pp. 16-17)
4
Relative prices depend according to (9) on the objective ratio of outputs, i.e.
on supply, and on the subjective partitioning of consumption expenditures, i.e. on
demand. The partitioning rE1, rE2 can be taken as the realization of the consumers’
optimal consumption plans (2011c, p. 6).
A straightforward result materializes as limiting case if the labor inputs of the
two firms stand in the same proportion as the expenditures for both products and
the markets are cleared:
P1
P2
=
R2
R1
if
L1
L2
=
C1
C2
=
ρE1
ρE2
and if ρX1 = 1; ρX2 = 1 |t (10)
If labor input is allocated according to the consumers’ preferences, which are
revealed by their expenditure ratios, then relative prices are inversely proportional to
the productivities in the two lines of production. Budget balancing, i.e. rE1+rE2=1,
is not required. We refer to this configuration as competitive structure.
The first question is how profits are distributed between the two firms. The
financial profit for each firm follows from (4) and is given by:
Q f i1 ≡ P1X1−W1L1
Q f i2 ≡ P2X2−W2L2 |t (11)
Using (10) one gets for relative profits in the competitive structure:
Q f i1
Q f i2
=
1−
W1
P1R1
1− W2
P1R1
C1
C2
if ρX1 = 1; ρX2 = 1 |t (12)
If the wage rates in the different lines of production are equal the numerical value
in the brackets is one and the ratio of profits is equal to the ratio of consumption
expenditures for the two products.
Equation (12) presupposes that the wage rate for all employees, i.e. inclusive
management and executives, is equal. This is normally not so; hence W has to be
taken as average wage rate that is given by:
W1 ≡W11 L11L1 + . . .+W1i
L1i
L1
+ . . .+W1n
L1n
L1
|t (13)
From the purely formal standpoint it suffices that the average wage rates W1
and W2 are equal. It is obvious, however, that the differentiation of wage rates
within a firm affects the partitioning of consumption expenditures if the individual
expenditure ratios of different employees are different. To keep things simple, this
interdependency between the distribution of wage rates within each firm and the
partitioning of consumption expenditures between the two firms is ruled out with
the assumption that the average expenditure ratios rE1, rE2 are, for the time being,
independent of the distribution of wages within the firms or, what amounts to the
same, that they are equal for the firm’s employees. Changes in the partitioning
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of consumption expenditures can be treated separately and then combined with
distributional changes.
For the comparison of firms of different size and with different absolute profits
the respective profit ratios are required. The profit ratio of the business sector as a
whole (8) has been directly derived from the profit definition (4) and is adapted for
a single firm as follows:
ρQ1 ≡ Q f i1W1L1 ≡
P1R1
W1
−1 if ρX1 = 1 |t (14)
Combining (11) and (10) one gets for relative profit ratios:
ρQ1
ρQ2
=
P1R1
W1
−1
P2R2
W2
−1
=
P1R1
W1
−1
P1R1
W2
−1
if ρX1 = 1; ρX2 = 1 |t (15)
If the average wage rates are equal the profitability of both firms is equal. There
is, though, no such thing as a “law” of uniform profitability because there is nothing
in the formalism that equalizes the wage rates between the two lines of production.
For the classics (Mill, 2006, p. 472) and even more so for Walras (Morishima, 1977,
pp. 82-83) profit equalization was self-evident. Walras gave a vivid description of
the spontaneous working of free competition that ends with – equal – zero profits:
‘les entrepreneurs ne font ni bénéfice ne perte’ (Walras, 2010, p. 225). Adam
Smith maintained that the equalization of profits rates would fall into one with the –
positive – rate of interest (Smith, 2008, p. 90). In contrast to these speculations4 the
structural axiomatic approach spells out the formal conditions without regress to
behavioral assumptions or the invocation of free competition.
If an equalizing mechanism exists it has to be separately identified and consis-
tently combined with the axiom set. The equality of wage rates and profitability
between the two firms is an additional formal property of the competitive production
structure and not a law-like necessity of the economic system. Whether profit ratios
are uniform or not does not affect relative prices as given by (9). For the competitive
structure therefore follows that relative prices are independent of the equalization of
profit ratios.
The structural precondition of a positive profit ratio for the economy as a whole
is given with (8). If the expenditure ratio rE is unity and the distributed profit ratio
rD is zero then the profit ratio for the business sector as a whole is zero. If wage
rates are not equal in this zero-profit economy the profit of one firm is equal to the
loss of the other and this is not a reproducible configuration in the longer run.
4 “All attempts to describe formally in a consistent and verisimilar fashion how an economy adjusts
from one uniform profit-rate regime to another have failed. Until such an adjustment process can
be reasonably modeled, its outcome – an equalized profit rate – is an article of faith, not a scientific
result” (Naples, 1988, p. 84). In (Debreu, 1959) and (Arrow and Hahn, 1991) uniform profit rates are
not explicitly referred to.
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When in the simplest case market clearing, i.e. rX=1, and budget balancing, i.e.
rE=1, is assumed, the only subjectively chosen variable is the expenditure ratio for
one product. The rest of the system is then determined by the conditions for the
competitive structure. If, in addition, the average wage rates and, by consequence,
the profit ratios in both firms are equal, no improvements are possible, neither for
the wage earners nor for the owners of the firms.
4 Two firms in one market
When two firms operate in one market they face the same price P. Accordingly (11)
changes to:
Q f i11 ≡ P1X11−W11L11
Q f i12 ≡ P1X12−W12L12 |t (16)
The price as dependent variable follows from the axiom set and the definitions
in the general form as:
P =
ρE
ρX
(1+ρD)
W
R
|t (17)
Under the condition of market clearing, i.e. rX=1, and budget balancing, i.e.
rE=1, the price depends alone on the distributed profit ratio and unit wage costs:
P = (1+ρD)
W
R
if ρX = 1; ρE = 1 |t (18)
The price comes down to unit wage costs if distributed profits are zero. This
is the familiar zero profit equilibrium case (Walras, 2010, p. 225). It has to be
emphasized that this case does not come about by competition but by the absence
of distributed profits or, more precisely by rE=1 and rD=0 in combination. The
assertion that competition, in the long run, brings prices down to costs and washes
profits away is not well founded. Competition has nothing to do with overall profits.
To conclude from the undeniable empirical fact that competition exerts a pressure
on individual profits that this must hold also for overall profits is a quite ordinary
fallacy of composition.
When, finally, the wage rate is taken as numéraire in (18), i.e. W= 1 [EUR/h]
(cf. Walras, 2010, p. 189), the absolute price for the one-product economy is given
as the inverse of productivity. This corresponds to (10) for relative prices. When, on
the other hand, the price is taken as numéraire, i.e. P= 1 [EUR/unit], then the wage
rate is numerically (though not dimensionally) equal to the productivity. This entails
in general terms that, in order to achieve absolute price stability at P=1, wage rate
and productivity have to move exactly in tandem.
Since wage rates differ between firms the wage rate in (17) is the average wage
rate that is given by:
W ≡W1 L1L +W2
L2
L
|t (19)
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The shares of total employment of the firms are defined as:
L≡ L1 +L2 ⇒ ρL1 ≡ 1−ρL2 ⇐ ρL1 ≡ L1L ; ρL2 ≡
L2
L
|t (20)
The wage ratio is defined as:
ρW ≡ W1W2 |t (21)
This gives for the average wage rate:
W ≡W2ρW (1−ρL2)+W2ρL2 ≡W2 (ρW (1−ρL2)+ρL2) |t (22)
Since productivities differ between firms the productivity in (17) is the average
productivity that is given by:
R≡ R1 L1L +R2
L2
L
|t (23)
The productivity ratio is defined as:
ρR ≡ R1R2 |t (24)
This gives for the average productivity:
R≡ R2ρR (1−ρL2)+R2ρL2 ≡ R2 (ρR (1−ρL2)+ρL2) |t (25)
For the general case the average unit wage costs that have to be substituted in
(17) are then given by:
W
R
≡ W2 (ρW (1−ρL2)+ρL2)
R2 (ρR (1−ρL2)+ρL2) |t (26)
Profit of firm1 (16) can now be rewritten as:
Q f i1 ≡ PR1L1−W1L1 ≡W1L1
(
PR1
W1
−1
)
if ρX1 = 1 |t (27)
After the substitution of (17) and some reshuffling that is carried out in detail in
the Appendix this yields:
Q f i1 ≡W1L1
ρE (1+ρD) 1−ρL2 +
ρL2
ρW
1−ρL2 + ρL2ρR
−1
 if ρX1 = 1 |t (28)
Thereof finally follows the profit ratio of firm1:
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ρQ1 ≡ ρE (1+ρD)
1−ρL2 + ρL2ρW
1−ρL2 + ρL2ρR︸ ︷︷ ︸
1⇒equalization
−1 if ρX1 = 1 |t (29)
In the ideal case rW=rR the profit ratio of firm1 is equal to the overall profit ratio
(8).
For the special case L1=L2, i.e. both firm are of equal size, and rE=1, rD=0, i.e.
the overall profit ratio is zero, the profit ratio of firm1 depends alone on the wage
ratio and the productivity ratio:
ρQ1 ≡
1+
1
ρW
1+
1
ρR
−1 |t (30)
The profit ratio of firm1 is zero if the wage ratio is equal to the productivity
ratio, otherwise firm1 makes a profit or a loss and thereby deviates from the overall
profit ratio. It is worth emphasizing that the profitability does not only depend on
the firm’s own wage rate W1 and productivity R1 but also directly on the respective
variables of the other firm. A wage increase in the other firm affects the profit ratio
of firm1 positively and a productivity increase negatively. This interdependency is a
significant difference to standard partial analysis that fends off mutual repercussions
with cet.par.
In the same manner the profit ratio of firm2 is now derived from (16).
Q f i2 ≡ PR2L2−W2L2 ≡W2L2
(
PR2
W2
−1
)
if ρX2 = 1 |t (31)
After the substitution of (17) and (26)
≡W2L2
(
ρE (1+ρD)
W2 (ρW (1−ρL2)+ρL2)
R2 (ρR (1−ρL2)+ρL2)
R2
W2
−1
)
(32)
and some reshuffling this yields:
Q f i2 ≡W2L2
ρE (1+ρD) ρWρR
1−ρL2 + ρL2ρW
1−ρL2 + ρL2ρR
−1
 if ρX2 = 1 |t (33)
Thereof finally follows the profit ratio of firm2:
ρQ2 ≡ ρE (1+ρD) ρWρR
1−ρL2 + ρL2ρW
1−ρL2 + ρL2ρR︸ ︷︷ ︸
1⇒equalization
−1 if ρX2 = 1 |t (34)
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In the ideal case rW=rR the profit ratio of firm2 is equal to the overall profit ratio
(8).
For the special case L1=L2 and rE=1; rD=0 the profit ratio of firm2 depends
alone on the wage ratio and the productivity ratio:
ρQ2 ≡ ρWρR
1+
1
ρW
1+
1
ρR
−1 |t (35)
This is the complementary to (30). If firm1 makes a profit firm2 makes a loss
and vice versa. The profit ratio of one firm depends on what happens in the other
firm.
5 Conditions of profit ratio equalization
In section 3 the pure consumption economy has first been divided into two different
product lines or industries as summarized in (36). Under the conditions of the
competitive structure the equalization of profit ratios between the two representative
firms requires that the average wage rates are equal. Total employment is allocated
according to the ratio rE1/rE2.
ρE
↙ ↘
ρE1 ρE2
↙ ↘ ↙ ↘
ρE11 ρE12 ρE21 ρE22
(36)
Now it is supposed that the productivity in industry2 increases. Relative prices
change according to (10). Let us assume at first that P2 falls. This has no effect
on the relation of profit ratios according to (15) as long as average wage rates in
the two industries remain unchanged. The price in industry2 declines with rising
productivity such that its own profit ratio remains unaltered.
We have, though, a sinking price level when P2 declines and P1 remains un-
changed. This is undesirable when we assign the price the role of the numéraire
(2011b, p. 17). Hence an increase of the average wage rate in both industries is in
order such that P1 rises and P2 falls to a lesser degree in accordance with (10). This
adaptation of relative prices leaves the price level steady. The productivity gain in
the second production line is evenly spread among all wage earners by the increase
of the average wage rate which is equal in both industries.
The analytically separate cases of sections 3 and 4 are now integrated into a hi-
erarchy as shown in (36). In the first production line firm11 and firm12 face the same
market price. Since their production conditions are normally non-identical their
profit ratios are different as long as the productivity differential is not compensated
for by a wage differential according to (29) and (34).
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It is supposed now that, starting from equal productivities, the productivity in
firm11 improves. The adaptation of the wage rates to the productivity differential
has to take place such that the wage rate in the less productive firm falls and in the
more productive firm rises. The adaptation must leave the average wage rate of the
first production line unchanged and equal to the wage rate in the second production
line. The relation of W11 and W12 is determined by:
W1 ≡W11 L11L1 +W12
L12
L1
=W2 |t (37)
If the average wage rate in industry1 remains constant and the average produc-
tivity R1 increases then the market clearing price has to fall:
P1 = ρE1 (1+ρD)
WL1
R1L
if W1 =W2 =W ; ρX1 = 1 |t (38)
This, again, calls for an increase of the average wage rates in both industries to
keep the price level steady.
If the profit ratios are uniform the allocation of the labor input between the two
firms plays no role for the firms provided they are geared exclusively to the profit
ratio and not to absolute profit. In this case the firms can be indifferent with regard
to employment because the profit ratio is independent of it. Hence the distribution of
labor input between the firms is indeterminate. Of importance is only that the total
employment in the first production line remains in proportion rE1/rE2 to that of the
second according to (10). While this proportion is determined by the households’
preferences the relation rE11/rE12 depends on the allocation of labor input between
the two firms. If not only the profit ratio but also absolute profit figures in the
target function of both firms this gives rise to competition about market shares
and the behavioral situation is unstable. It becomes stable not before one firm is
left over as monopolist. Hence the equalization of profit ratios does not suspend
competition and does not put the system behaviorally at rest. The tendency towards
monopolization is still at work.
The equalization of wage ratio and productivity ratio is behaviorally stable
only under the condition that the employees in the firm with the lower productivity
accept that their average wage rate is lower compared to the average wage rate of
the firm with the higher productivity. As soon as employees start to migrate the
high productivity firm grows and the low productivity firm shrinks. Behavioral
stability of employees presupposes the equalization of productivities and wage rates,
that means, both firms have to become identical. Yet even in this limiting case
competition about market shares continues.
From the outside perspective the voluntary migration that is induced by wage
differentials is preferable to the situation with equal wage rates in both firms be-
cause the latter configuration moves the less productive firm closer to the brink of
bankruptcy. Bankruptcy and the temporary (in the best case) unemployment that
comes along with it is an inefficient way to carry through the migration and to arrive
ultimately at the same destination.
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6 Conclusion
The equalization of profit ratios in the competitive structure requires an equal
average wage rate between two industries and a wage ratio that is equal to the
productivity ratio between two firm in the same market. Uniform profit ratios,
though, are not necessarily conductive to a behaviorally stable state of economic
affairs.
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Appendix
Q f i1 ≡W1L1
(
ρE (1+ρD)
W2 (ρW (1−ρL2)+ρL2)
R2 (ρR (1−ρL2)+ρL2)
R1
W1
−1
)
(39)
≡W1L1
(
ρE (1+ρD)
W2 (ρW (1−ρL2)+ρL2)
R2 (ρR (1−ρL2)+ρL2)
ρRR2
ρWW2
−1
)
(40)
≡W1L1
(
ρE (1+ρD)
ρR
ρW
(ρW (1−ρL2)+ρL2)
(ρR (1−ρL2)+ρL2) −1
)
(41)
Q f i1 ≡W1L1
ρE (1+ρD) 1−ρL2 +
ρL2
ρW
1−ρL2 + ρL2ρR
−1
 (42)
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